including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Introduction
On the evening of 20 July 1969, the night before they were meant to leave for Rota, Spain, the First Battalion, Sixth Marines, stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, celebrated their last night before deployment. While many US citizens were watching Neil Armstrong take his first step on the moon, around 200 Marines drank and danced at a service club on base. By most accounts, this interracial group of partygoers enjoined in a fairly peaceable event that evening, but just before eleven o'clock a bloodied and 'intensely excited' white Marine barged into the club and pronounced that he had been assaulted by a group of black Marines. Over the next half hour, fifteen white Marines were assaulted, reportedly by groups of black and Puerto Rican Marines who were heard shouting statements such as 'White beasts' and 'Call us niggers now'. Some of the injured Marines were hospitalized, and a week later, white corporal Edward Bankston died from head injuries sustained during an assault. 1 Though rarely fatal, events like Lejeune had become all too common within the military. though they, like political leaders, rarely explained what constituted 'black militancy'. Nonetheless, they felt this phenomenon had a great deal to do with the military's race-related problems, including events like Lejeune. Indeed, the charge of 'black militancy' was often used to set the parameters for acceptable (and unacceptable) behaviors and discourse. During its first years, however, from 1971-74, DRRI exhibited little concern with 'black militancy', and in fact its own framework for understanding US race relations seems to have been highly influenced by the thinking of Black Power activists. This essay explores the military's concern with and attempts to contain 'black militancy' during the late 1960s and early 1970s, including its founding of DRRI. It examines DRRI's first years and its focus on whiteness as well as blackness during this time, as it argues that the Institute's framework produced both a moment of unanticipated radicalism in military race relations and a different kind of anxiety over race and 'militancy' for military leadership.
While DRRI interested many military researchers during the 1970s and has found some recent attention with military historians, the history of DRRI has rarely been mined for its relationship to the larger landscape of US race relations. 3 Moreover, the Institute itself and some recent scholarship simplistically portray DRRI as the triumphant manifestation of a benevolent DoD heeding the concerns of black personnel and the larger civil rights movement. However, I posit that there was a more complex relationship between the racial knowledges circulating within and among the civilian and military sectors. Moreover, by paying attention to the ways in which political and military leaders conceived of 'black militancy' as a threat needing to be contained, I challenge the triumphalist narrative and offer a more nuanced understanding the founding of DRRI. I argue that DRRI was expected, at least in part, to help contain 'black militancy'.
Yet, in no small part because of its racial epistemology, which, Hampton rightly points out, was heavily influenced by progressive black freedom activists, DRRI was forced to modify its curriculum. I aim to show that, in order to understand why DRRI itself stood accused of race 'militancy' in the mid1970s -and underwent a secret Pentagon investigation -we must examine a key aspect of its racial framework: its critical understanding of whiteness as a social construction and a nexus of power.
The military's 'race problem': containing black 'militancy'
In the late 1960s, the military's race-based problems were widespread, manifold and escalating. An increase in research and reporting by both civilians and military personnel revealed that labor was stratified along racial lines and patterns of institutional racism shaped all enlistees' experience.
Generally speaking, peoples of color were clustered in low-skilled and non-technical positions due to the in-built bias of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which placed all recruits on their military career paths and which tended to reflect the knowledge of dominant white culture. As Ebony writer David Llorens wrote in 1968, this meant that 'a black man who hasn't mastered white culture cannot, for example, learn how to repair machinery' and excel at this skilled portion of the test.
6
African Americans were thus under-represented in military leadership (3.9 percent of Army officers were black, though the percentage of African Americans in its ranks more than trebled that figure) and over-represented among combat troops and, consequently, among the US's Vietnam War dead.
The system of draft deferment compounded these problems; eligible African Americans were about twice as likely as their white counterparts to be drafted. In the end, African Americans accounted for 5 Hampton The serious racial disturbance at Camp Lejeune on July 20 did not result from any specific provocation, but was generated by a few militant blacks who fanned the flames of racism, misconception, suspicions, and frustrations. before they came into the Armed Forces,' he avowed, black service personnel were more likely to express 'their desire for equal treatment.' 16 While racial grievances certainly were not divorced from the larger US social milieu, attaching black 'militancy' to the civilian sector in this way further ensured that the endemic racism of the military itself was obscured. Thus, the military's racial ills were first rewritten in terms of black 'militancy' rather than widespread inequalities and discrimination; then, black 'militancy' was viewed as a problem to contain, rather than a phenomenon to understand.
DRRI's radical racial framework
Despite its reticence to accept responsibility for racial discrimination, military leadership began to take the problems of racial discord seriously toward the end of the 1960s, and as Westheider and Richard rectify racially discriminatory patterns in the military's penal system, for instance, it mandated that non-judicial punishments meted out to the lowest paid service personnel, who were disproportionately peoples of color, be published. The AFQT was adapted, as well, and became the Army Classification Battery, which was supposed to be less culturally biased.
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The most intensive efforts carried out, however, related to race relations education. In 1970, identified as white or African American. During their time at the Institute, they formed two-person teams that included an officer and an enlisted person, one white and one non-white, and upon leaving DRRI, these teams went on to co-lead race relations seminars at bases around the world. Such confrontation often resulted in the 'isolation' of the individual, which gave him or her time to consider the 'impact' of their prejudices. 30 This method brought little comfort to those who made racist remarks, but it could work to protect the people who were most often hurt by such racist remarks, usually peoples of color. Moreover, even after inductees graduated from the Institute and became race relations instructors, they were expected to continue independent study into the history and ideologies of peoples of color in the US and stay attuned to 'minority strategies' for fighting racism.
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Pedagogically, then, DRRI's earliest years proved rigorous and challenging.
Though the curriculum covered procedural aspects related to, for instance, equal opportunity policies, studies largely centered on racism and race relations in the US, and DRRI's understanding Although the Institute stressed the structured nature of racism in US society, it and its subsidiary schools took care to connect the individual to the institutional. At the opening of the Army's Oberammergau-based race relations school, which supplemented the work of DRRI graduates in the Army, Major General Harold Hayward discussed the need for the school:
The reason we have [race relations courses] is because equal opportunity for all in USAREUR [US Army Europe] does not exist at this time, nor do we have the kind of attitude toward equal opportunity and human relations approach toward getting along with each other that we should have. 44 Significantly, Hayward continued by not only linking these structural issues with individuals in the military but by specifically implicating the average white soldier or sailor, not black 'militants':
Young white soldiers agree that there are changes that need to be made, but they can't see a requirement that they should change their attitude nor the military system. The only requirement they think should be made is in the attitude and performance of young black soldiers. This is an unhealthy situation.
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Hinting at widespread denunciations of black 'militancy', Hayward forwarded the viewpoint of DRRIthat whites' refusal to understand the connections between their personal views, the 'military system', and the perpetuation of racial inequalities was detrimental to military race relations. Moreover, he implied that such concerns over black 'militancy' in fact worked to eclipse whites' responsibilities in ameliorating the military's race-based problems.
In effect, then, DRRI's leaders and instructors challenged preoccupations with black 'militancy'
and posited a radically different understanding of race relations. DRRI's racial framework may not Indeed, whereas the military as a whole reacted anxiously to so-called 'black militancy', DRRI embraced many tenets that were central to Black Power. Among these, and key to understanding why DRRI's framework was so radical (particularly for the military), was its ideas about the 'place' of whites within anti-racism efforts. As an ideology, Black Power challenged dominant racial notions that placed the responsibility for ending racial inequalities onto persons of color, especially African the closing of all branch-specific race relations schools. 57 As Hope has argued, in the wake of these events DRRI's radical approach to race relations shifted significantly:
The content of the curriculum changed from a black/white confrontation to one increasingly less direct and more academic in direction…DRRI was ultimately to develop a more conservative approach to the study and training of race relations instructors. In the future, discussions were to stress ways of improving military intergroup relations and to devote less time to examining racism in military history. 58 Taking place between 1974 and 1977, these changes coincided with a reduction in the number of mandated annual hours to be spent in such education, as well as a shift in the onus of this education onto commanders, who did not go through the intensive training that DRRI attendees had. Hence, DRRI graduates spent far less time in race-based instruction. While seventy percent of those graduating from DRRI between 1971-74 went on to work full time on RR instruction, by 1976 this figure had dropped to ten percent. 59 Thus, by the mid-1970s, the value of both the Institute and of race relations education more generally began to shift in the minds of military and political leaders, prompting changes in DRRI's racial framework and pedagogical methods, as well as in the workload of those it trained.
Conclusions
Founded amidst a complex configuration of fears, anxieties and desires for change, DRRI did not simply represent the military's attempts to heed the frustrations of service personnel of color, despite its recent characterization as such. 60 Seeing DRRI in such triumphalist terms oversimplifies the historical moment in which the Institute was founded and fails to interrogate the complex political meanings attached to the Institute. For many, there was a clear expectation that DRRI would aid political and military leaders in the quest to contain black 'militancy,' that race relations training would alleviate the military's racial tensions by bringing black 'militants' around to less radical ways of thinking. As the post-Lejeune Congressional subcommittee put it, the Armed Forces was in 'battle with black militants for the minds of…young marines' and other service personnel. 61 DRRI's role in this 'battle' was not uncomplicated, but, as I have tried to show, many imagined that the 'minds' of new or young service personnel could be won over through the race relations trainings of DRRI graduates. In other words, to many, the Institute was to serve as an epistemological intervention into the consciousness of a generation of young black 'militants.'
However, the racial epistemology that military and political leaders sought to contain was, in fact, eagerly adopted by the Institute, and central to this epistemology was a critique of whiteness as a nexus of racialized power. As I have argued elsewhere, the post-war black freedom movement represented rich critiques of whiteness, and these were analyses that whites (like Terry) often engaged and proselytized. 62 Certainly different from the academic tradition that would later be called 'critical whiteness studies', these ideas still shared a good deal with this later academic tradition. They explored the connections between racial inequalities and white domination and anticipated a number of the central tenets of critical whiteness studies. As feminist sociologist Ruth Frankenberg showed many years later, DRRI suggested that whiteness often went 'unmarked' though it shaped the culture and policies of both the military and wider US society, and as cultural geographer Anoop Nayak would later argue, DRRI's focus on whiteness redirected the dominant racial gaze (generally onto blackness, including black 'militancy') and centered the accountability of whites in racial injustices. 63 arena of race relations, perhaps especially in this realm, ideas about race and racism needed to be regulated. Of course, the surveillance of DRRI must be seen as part of a much longer legacy of governmental reconnaissance of supposed race 'militants', especially with regards to African Americans. However it also speaks to the ways in which the epithet, label or accusation of 'militancy' became attached, not just to certain racial justice activists, groups, or movements, but also to racial epistemologies. As Theodore Kornweibel, Jr., has argued with regard to federal efforts to 'suppress' progressive black activists in the years following WWI, 'The "crime" which justified such surveillance was almost always the ideas they expressed.' 64 The earliest years of DRRI corroborate this pointthat it was the way one thought about race and racism, as much as the actions one took in light of that knowledge, that could raise suspicions of race 'militancy'.
